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Survey data is used to estimate the impact of physical attractiveness rated by the interviewer 
as well as by the respondent on employment probability and labor income of men and 
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regressions are applied to analyze heterogeneity across the wage distribution. 
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1.  Introduction 
The impact of beauty, more precisely of subjective perceptions of physical attractiveness, on 
labor market outcomes has received increasing attention during last years (e.g., Hamermesh and 
Biddle, 1994; Hamermesh et al., 2002; French, 2002; Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Fletcher, 
2009). In addition to the naive interest in physical attractiveness and popular discussion of the 
beauty myth, an economic interest arises in the context of productivity as well as statistical and 
taste discrimination (Hamermesh and Biddle, 1994).
1 First, physical attractiveness might be 
positively correlated with non-cognitive or social skills (e.g., higher self-esteem) and sympathy 
feelings (e.g., better working climate), which increase workers and co-workers productivity 
( /0 MPL b   ;  MPL: marginal product of labor, b: beauty or physical attractiveness). As 
attractiveness is a proxy for such unobserved characteristics, firms might statistical discriminate 
in favor of more attractive persons and pay them higher wages (labor demand FOC for profit 
maximizing firm:  () b wp M P L b    with  /0 b wb  ;  w: wage). Second, customer taste 
discrimination increases the value of marginal product of more attractive workers. If customers 
have a higher willingness to pay for otherwise equal products and services of more attractive 
persons ( b p pb  ; p: price, b: beauty premium), firms are likely to employ more attractive 
workers to increase revenues and profits and can pay them higher wages (FOC: 
() b wp b M P L    with  /0 b wb   ) (Pfann et al., 2000). Third, employer taste discrimination 
                                                 
1 Statistical discrimination in its simplest form implies that firms use signals to reduce uncertainties about workers' 
individual productivities and consequently prefer to recruit workers who belong to a group with on average more 
favorable characteristics (Aigner and Cain, 1977). Taste discrimination implies that physical attractiveness of other 
people enters individual utility functions of customers, employers, or co-workers (Becker, 1971).  3 
can increase employment chances and wages of more attractive people, if an employer is willing 
to pay higher wages to see more attractive workers in his firm ( b ww b    with  /0 b wb   ).  
In line with the above considerations, previous studies for Canada, China, and the U.S. have 
indeed found that more attractive people earn on average higher wages (e.g., Hamermesh and 
Biddle, 1994; Hamermesh et al., 2002; French, 2002; Fletcher, 2009). This research note 
contributes new microeconometric evidence from German survey data, which comprise 
information on subjective attractiveness evaluations by the interviewer and the interviewed 
person. In addition to mean linear wage effects of physical attractiveness, I analyze non-linearity 
of the wage effect as well as heterogeneity of the effect across the wage distribution. Moreover, 
this research note looks at the effect of attractiveness on employment probabilities. 
 
2.  Data and Variables 
The used data is the 2008 cross section of a German General Social Survey named ALLBUS 
(Terwey, 2000). More than 3000 individuals across Germany are asked several questions about 
employment, income, education, social and political behavior etc. in personal interviews. Of 
special interest for this study are three variables about the physical attractiveness of the 
interviewed person. First, the interviewer rates the physical attractiveness of the respondent at the 
start (first impression) and at the end of an interview. Second, the respondent is asked how he 
would rate his attractiveness. All three ratings (interviewer at start, interviewer at end, self-rating) 
have identical coding ranging from one for very unattractive to eleven for very attractive. Even 
though interviewer ratings as well as self-ratings are subject to a subjectivity bias, they include 
valuable information because perceived and not objective attractiveness should actually influence 4 
labor market outcomes. Self-ratings might further suffer from a comparison bias because 
individuals are likely to choose comparison groups that make them feel better (Falk and Knell, 
2004), e.g., average attractive people compare themselves with less attractive people and not with 
more attractive people. Nevertheless, such self-ratings as proxies for self perceptions are 
meaningful in the context of non-cognitive skills such as confidence (French, 2002). 
Table 1 contains basic descriptive information about the attractiveness variables of employed 
workers. Differences between interviewer ratings at the start and at the end of an interview are 
small. Such a comparison is still useful, because it can be seen that the interviewer perceives the 
respondent on average as slightly more attractive after the interview has been finished. 
Furthermore, the standard deviations of ratings at end of an interview are smaller suggesting that 
more extreme first impressions are mitigated during the interview. More impressive are however 
the differences between interviewer and self-ratings. Respondents perceive themselves on 
average as significant less attractive than the interviewer does. 
- Insert Table 1 about here. 
The dependent variables in the subsequent econometric models are a binary employment status 
variable, for which a Probit model is applied, and the log monthly net labor income, for which 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is applied. In addition to the attractiveness variables, the estimates 
for employment probabilities include a female dummy, secondary schooling and college degrees, 
age, squared age, and a regional dummy for Eastern Germany. The earnings functions control 
additionally for ten working hours categories, which is important because the dependent variable 
is based on monthly income and not on hourly wages. The "employment probability sample" as 
well as the "earnings sample" contain only German individuals aged between 18 and 65 years. 5 
The "earnings sample" is further restricted to employed workers with a labor income of at least 
400 Euros per month. Descriptive statistics for the "earnings sample" are presented in Table 1. 
 
3.  Econometric Results 
3.1   Employment Effects 
Table 2 presents absolute marginal effects on the employment probability obtained from binary 
Probit estimates. The results for attractiveness rated by interviewer at start and end of an 
interview are virtually identical and jointly discussed (specifications (1) and (2)). A one point 
higher attractiveness rating on the eleven point scale is associated with an approximately three 
percentage point higher employment probability. This effect is quite sizeable. A five point 
difference in attractiveness has for example the same impact as being female or having a college 
degree. The marginal effects of self-rated attractiveness (specifications (3)) are also positive and 
significant but about one percentage point smaller in size than effects of interviewer ratings. 
Separate estimates for men and women show that the effects of all attractiveness variables are 
positive and significant for both genders and somewhat larger for men than for women.    
- Insert Table 2 about here. 
 
3.2   Mean Linear Wage Effects 
The results for the log linear earnings functions are presented in Table 3. Since attractiveness 
enters the earnings functions in a linear fashion, the estimated coefficients are the mean linear 6 
effects of attractiveness on wages. Attractiveness ratings by interviewer have statistical 
significant and sizeable positive effects. Workers, who get a one point higher attractiveness rating 
on the eleven point scale, earn on average about three percent higher monthly income. The rates 
of return to attractiveness are larger for men than for women. The estimated effects are also larger 
for interviewer ratings at start (specifications (1)) than at end of an interview (specifications (2)). 
Self-rated attractiveness has a significant positive effect on female but not on male wages 
(specifications (3)). Including both interviewer ratings and self-ratings in one equation leads to 
estimated coefficients that are virtually identical for the interviewer rating at the start of an 
interview and not significantly different from zero for the two other attractiveness ratings.
2 The 
overall results indicate that the first impression other people have about a person's attractiveness 
are most important in explaining variance of earnings. 
- Insert Table 3 about here. 
 
3.3   Mean Non-Linear Wage Effects 
The previous earnings regressions for men and women are re-estimated with an additional 
squared term of the attractiveness rating. Based on these results, predicted log income profiles for 
an average worker conditional on attractiveness ratings are plotted in Figure 1 for men and in 
Figure 2 for women. Male profiles are concave and virtually identical for interviewer ratings at 
start and end of an interview. The concavity implies that wage punishment for unattractiveness is 
larger than wage premium for attractiveness. This interpretation becomes even stronger if one 
reconsiders that average male attractiveness rated by interviewer is about 7.8 and hence quite 
                                                 
2 The results of this regression are not included in this note but can be requested from the author. 7 
close to the maximum of the profile. Moreover, interviewer ratings have a larger impact on male 
earnings than self-ratings. The profiles for women are rather linear and do not differ significantly 
between the different attractiveness measures. It can also be seen that profiles are steeper for men 
than for women. 
- Insert Figure 1 about here. 
- Insert Figure 2 about here. 
 
3.4   Heterogeneous Wage Effects Across Wage Distribution 
The previous earnings regressions estimated mean wage effects of attractiveness. To extend the 
perspective on the entire wage distribution, I estimate simultaneous quantile regressions for the 
0.05, 0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90, and 0.95 quantiles based on the complete sample. Table 4 
contains the results of the estimated coefficients for attractiveness ratings.
3 The impact of 
attractiveness rated by interviewer is slightly larger in higher wage quantiles, whereas the 
evidence is not clear cut for self-rated attractiveness. The overall results show positive rates of 
return to attractiveness across the entire wage distribution.  
- Insert Table 4 about here. 
 
                                                 
3 The complete estimation results can be requested from the author. 8 
4.  Conclusion 
Main results of this research note are: (1) More attractive people are on average more likely to be 
employed and earn on average higher wages. The effects are statistically significant and quite 
sizeable. (2) The estimated effects of interviewer ratings are in general larger for men than for 
women, whereas self-ratings have larger effects among women. (3) Attractiveness rated by other 
people, in our case the interviewer, has a larger impact than self-rated attractiveness. (4) The 
wage effects of attractiveness are non-linear for men, which implies that wage punishment for 
unattractiveness is larger than wage premium for attractiveness, and linear for women. (5) The 
wage effects of attractiveness are positive across the entire wage distribution. 
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Tables and Figure included in Text 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for "earnings sample" 
All (n=1224) Men  (n=692) Women  (n=532) 
Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Log of monthly net labor income (log Euros)  7.3118  0.5509  7.4720  0.5370  7.1036  0.4969 
Attractiveness - rated by interviewer at start (1: low, 11: high)  7.9191  1.7569  7.7558  1.7440  8.1316  1.7525 
Attractiveness - rated by interviewer at end (1: low, 11: high)  7.9894  1.6938  7.8454  1.6532  8.1767  1.7290 
Attractiveness - self-rated by respondent (1: low, 11: high)  7.1217  1.7914  7.0434  1.7887  7.2237  1.7916 
Female  (Dummy)  0.4346 0.4959 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
Schooling  degree  medium  ("Realschule")  (Dummy)  0.4191 0.4936 0.3931 0.4888 0.4530 0.4983 
Schooling  degree  high  ("Gymnasium")  (Dummy)  0.3538 0.4783 0.3512 0.4777 0.3571 0.4796 
College  degree  (Dummy)  0.2402 0.4274 0.2413 0.4282 0.2387 0.4267 
Age  in  years  43.0833 11.3467 43.0130 11.5684 43.1748 11.0620 
Age squared / 100  19.8482  9.4565  19.8375  9.6064  19.8620  9.2669 





Table 2: Attractiveness and employment probability (Probit, marginal effects) 
(1) All  (1) Men  (1) Women  (2) All  (2) Men  (2) Women  (3) All  (3) Men  (3) Women 
Attractiveness - interviewer at start  0.0307***  0.0329***  0.0263***              
(0.0057) (0.0070) (0.0085)              
Attractiveness - interviewer at end  0.0337***  0.0376***  0.0266***              
(0.0058)  (0.0071)  (0.0086)              
Attractiveness - self-rated  0.0215*** 0.0258***  0.0148*     
(0.0056)  (0.0071)  (0.0083)    
Female  -0.1747***  -0.1766***  -0.1672***              
(0.0201)  (0.0201)  (0.0203)              
Schooling  medium  0.0923***  0.0674**  0.1287*** 0.0895***  0.0613*  0.1295*** 0.0960***  0.0657**  0.1365*** 
(0.0252) (0.0318) (0.0383) (0.0253) (0.0318) (0.0382) (0.0254) (0.0322) (0.0381)       
Schooling  high  -0.0047 -0.0617 0.0777 -0.0069 -0.0621 0.0755 0.0080 -0.0436  0.0865*     
(0.0322) (0.0420) (0.0475) (0.0322) (0.0418) (0.0477) (0.0318) (0.0415) (0.0472)       
College  0.1736*** 0.1574*** 0.1829*** 0.1708*** 0.1518*** 0.1836*** 0.1766*** 0.1586*** 0.1906*** 
(0.0266) (0.0286) (0.0452) (0.0268) (0.0290) (0.0450) (0.0267) (0.0293) (0.0448)       
Age  in  years  0.0720*** 0.0671*** 0.0718*** 0.0729*** 0.0684*** 0.0721*** 0.0730*** 0.0701*** 0.0701*** 
(0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0084) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0084)       
Age  squared  /  100  -0.0889*** -0.0844*** -0.0865*** -0.0899*** -0.0858*** -0.0870*** -0.0905*** -0.0883*** -0.0850*** 
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0096) (0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0096) (0.0060) (0.0071) (0.0097)       
East  Germany  -0.1040***  -0.1569*** -0.0419 -0.1029***  -0.1518*** -0.0428 -0.1073***  -0.1619*** -0.0437       
(0.0234) (0.0310) (0.0341) (0.0234) (0.0309) (0.0342) (0.0236) (0.0315) (0.0342)       
Predicted employment  
probability  at  means  0.7236 0.8062 0.6351 0.7245 0.8083 0.6352 0.7207 0.8028 0.6341       
Pseudo  R²  0.1607 0.1992 0.1166 0.1630 0.2045 0.1169 0.1534 0.1951 0.1082       
Number  of  observations  2201 1135 1066 2201 1135 1066 2158 1110 1048       




Table 3: Attractiveness and income (OLS, mean linear effects) 
(1) All  (1) Men  (1) Women  (2) All  (2) Men  (2) Women  (3) All  (3) Men  (3) Women 
Attractiveness - interviewer at start  0.0338***  0.0403***  0.0233**             
(0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0102)             
Attractiveness - interviewer at end  0.0288***  0.0344***  0.0189*             
(0.0074)  (0.0104)  (0.0105)             
Attractiveness - self-rated  0.0131** 0.0114 0.0197**   
(0.0066) (0.0087) (0.0099)       
Female -0.1968***  -0.1953***  -0.1875*** 
(0.0250) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
Schooling  medium  0.1179*** 0.0803* 0.2061***  0.1214*** 0.0788* 0.2124***  0.1319***  0.0894**  0.2215*** 
(0.0310) (0.0412) (0.0452) (0.0310) (0.0413) (0.0454) (0.0309) (0.0414) (0.0447)       
Schooling  high  0.1596***  0.1246**  0.2409*** 0.1636***  0.1343**  0.2403*** 0.1764*** 0.1538*** 0.2454*** 
(0.0392) (0.0542) (0.0543) (0.0392) (0.0540) (0.0546) (0.0386) (0.0531) (0.0536)       
College  0.3217*** 0.3155*** 0.3226*** 0.3213*** 0.3111*** 0.3255*** 0.3313*** 0.3152*** 0.3327*** 
(0.0392) (0.0527) (0.0587) (0.0393) (0.0529) (0.0590) (0.0390) (0.0525) (0.0586)       
Age  in  years  0.0530*** 0.0654*** 0.0307*** 0.0528*** 0.0653*** 0.0303*** 0.0534*** 0.0650*** 0.0307*** 
(0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0074) (0.0096) (0.0113) (0.0074) (0.0097) (0.0113)       
Age squared / 100  -0.0497***  -0.0613***  -0.0277**  -0.0497***  -0.0612***  -0.0275**  -0.0511***  -0.0616***  -0.0281**  
(0.0089) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0089) (0.0116) (0.0136) (0.0089) (0.0118) (0.0135)       
East  Germany  -0.2958*** -0.3543*** -0.2323*** -0.2904*** -0.3432*** -0.2303*** -0.2859*** -0.3420*** -0.2270*** 
(0.0262) (0.0364) (0.0377) (0.0262) (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0264) (0.0373) (0.0377)       
Ten  working  hours  categories  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  5.1741*** 4.9619*** 5.4844*** 5.2151*** 5.0105*** 5.5281*** 5.3342*** 5.2012*** 5.5283*** 
(0.1709) (0.2713) (0.2373) (0.1700) (0.2631) (0.2395) (0.1733) (0.2750) (0.2345)       
R²  0.5032 0.4746 0.4367 0.4998 0.4691 0.4345 0.4944 0.4602 0.4356       
Adjusted  R²  0.4962 0.4621 0.4192 0.4927 0.4565 0.4170 0.4873 0.4474 0.4180       
Number of observations  1224  692  532  1224  692  532  1224  692  532    


































1 3 5 7 9 11
attractiveness (1: low, 11: high)
attractiveness rated by interviewer at the start
attractiveness rated by interviewer at the end
attractiveness self-rated by interviewed person
Note: Based on estimations for male sample.
 
































1 3 5 7 9 11
attractiveness (1: low, 11: high)
attractiveness rated by interviewer at the start
attractiveness rated by interviewer at the end
attractiveness self-rated by interviewed person
Note: Based on estimations for female sample.
 








Table 4: Attractiveness and income across the wage distribution (simultaneous quantile regressions) 
Quantiles 
5%  10%  25% 50% 75% 90%  95% 
Attractiveness - interviewer at start  0.0213*  0.0262**  0.0293***  0.0295***  0.0426***  0.0343***  0.0385**  
(0.0118)  (0.0133)  (0.0096) (0.0069) (0.0092) (0.0104)  (0.0181)     
Attractiveness - interviewer at end  0.0180  0.0252**  0.0242***  0.0222***  0.0391***  0.0303***  0.0450**  
(0.0124)  (0.0125)  (0.0088) (0.0068) (0.0100) (0.0109)  (0.0195)     
Attractiveness - self-rated  0.0174*  0.0012  0.0086  0.0066  0.0201**  0.0081  0.0139 
(0.0105)  (0.0102)  (0.0089) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0116)  (0.0175) 
Notes: Simultaneous quantile regressions for complete sample (n=1224), separately for different attractiveness variables, coefficients. All regressions 
control for gender, secondary schooling and college degrees, age, squared age, East Germany, eleven working hours categories. Bootstrapped
standard errors with 100 replications in parentheses. Coefficients significant at * 10%, ** 5%, and *** 1%. 
 
 
 